The importance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for measuring IQ by Borghans, L. et al.
  
 
The importance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
for measuring IQ
Citation for published version (APA):
Borghans, L., Meijers, H. H. M., & ter Weel, B. J. (2013). The importance of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation for measuring IQ. (UNU-MERIT Working Papers; No. 006). Maastricht: UNU-MERIT,
Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2013
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
  
 
  
 
 
 
#2013-006 
 
The importance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for measuring IQ 
Lex Borghans, Huub Meijers and Bas ter Weel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maastricht Economic and social Research institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU‐MERIT) 
email: info@merit.unu.edu | website: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) 
email: info‐governance@maastrichtuniversity.nl | website: http://mgsog.merit.unu.edu 
 
Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499 
Working Paper Series 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
Maastricht Economic and social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, 
UNU-MERIT 
 
Maastricht Graduate School of Governance  
MGSoG 
 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research 
carried out at UNU-MERIT and MGSoG to stimulate discussion on the issues raised. 
 
 
 
 
 
The importance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for measuring IQ* 
 
 
 
Lex Borghans 
Department of Economics and Research Centre for Education  
and the Labour Market, Maastricht University 
lex.borghans@maastrichtuniversity.nl  
 
Huub Meijers 
Department of Economics and UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University 
huub.meijers@maastrichtuniversity.nl  
 
 Bas ter Weel 
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Research 
and Department of Economics, Maastricht University 
b.ter.weel@cpb.nl  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This research provides an economic model of the way people behave during an IQ test. We 
distinguish a technology that describes how time investment improves performance from 
preferences that determine how much time people invest in each question. We disentangle 
these two elements empirically using data from a laboratory experiment. The main findings 
are that both intrinsic (questions that people like to work on) and extrinsic motivation 
(incentive payments) increase time investments and as a result performance. The presence of 
incentive payments seems to be more important than the size of the reward. Intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations turn out to be complements. 
 
Keywords: incentives; cognitive test scores 
JEL Codes: J20; J24 
 
  
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Bas ter Weel, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, P.O. Box 80510, 
2508GM The Hague, the Netherlands. T: (31)703383396; E: b.ter.weel@cpb.nl. 
 
We would like to thank Anton de Vries for advice about the use of cognitive tests. Flavio Cunha and James 
Heckman have contributed to this work through very helpful discussions. The thoughtful comments of the 
referee of this journal have improved the analysis further. We also acknowledge the useful comments of 
participants at the 2008 Meeting of the European Association of Labour Economists in Amsterdam and seminar 
participants at Maastricht University. 
 1
1. Introduction 
 It has been well-documented that individual test scores on achievement and IQ tests 
are sensitive to incentives (e.g., Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman & Ter Weel, 2008). 
Students perform better on high-stakes tests and if they are paid for their performance (e.g., 
Duckworth & Seligman, 2005 and Sackett, Borneman & Connelly, 2008). The role of 
incentives in stimulating the performance during achievement tests implies that the expressed 
effort can be seen as an economic decision. Hence, an economic perspective sheds light on 
how IQ tests are influenced by changing circumstances during the test. 
 The aim of this research is to analyse people’s performance on an IQ test from an 
economic point of view. Economists are increasingly interested in including psychological 
measures, such as IQ, in their analyses explaining differences across a range of individual 
outcomes. However, these measures have been developed to answer psychological questions 
and careful attention is needed in applying them to economic analyses. To answer economic 
questions by using these measures it is important to apply an economic perspective on what is 
measured and consider how circumstances and incentives affect scores. We present an 
economic model and estimate its components. When answering questions on an IQ test, 
performance improves when a participant takes more time. A participant has to decide how 
much time to invest in a question. Outcomes on each question depend on (i) the technology 
described by a production function in which time investment determines the probability of a 
right answer; and (ii) preferences for a right answer relative to the time invested. Preferences 
and technology together determine the optimal time investment and hence the score on each 
of the questions. It is important to note that this research is concerned with individual 
behaviour during an IQ test, not with measuring an individual’s IQ per se. 
 We empirically investigate this model by applying data from a laboratory experiment, 
described in Borghans, Meijers & Ter Weel (2008), in which students answered several types 
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of questions, common in standard IQ tests, with varying monetary incentives and time 
constraints. The empirical part of this paper is based on the data obtained in that experiment. 
In the previous paper we investigate how people with different personalities respond to 
incentives. In this paper we use the same data to disentangle the production function and 
preferences in answering questions, to understand how people perform on IQ tests.  
 Our most important findings can be summarized as follows. Participants have higher 
intrinsic motivation on some questions (especially the most difficult ones) relative to others. 
In addition, participants invest more time in answering questions when incentive payments 
are introduced. However, the preference for correctly answering a question with incentives is 
not proportional to the size of the incentive. An incentive as such seems to be more important 
than its monetary value. Extrinsic monetary incentives have a bigger impact on the time 
invested into questions for which students have a higher intrinsic motivation. This suggests 
complementarity between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Indeed, when estimating a CES 
production function with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as the two inputs, we obtain 
complementarity.  
 The analysis in this research contributes to our understanding of how the 
circumstances of a test affect the performance of people during the test. To better understand 
the relationship between measures such as IQ and achievement and economic outcomes, these 
economic factors influencing tests scores have to be taken into account. The model also offers 
a framework to analyse differences in the way people perform on tests, which contributes to 
our understanding of variation in test scores beyond the pure variation in intelligence. The 
approach can be used in the same way to analyse achievement tests because it is conceptually 
equivalent to the process during an IQ test. A large body of literature linking intelligence to 
future outcomes uses data obtained from achievement tests, because these measures are 
available in large longitudinal surveys. A well-known measure of achievement is the AFQT in 
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the NLSY. 
 This paper is related to the literature about the effects on incentives on IQ scores and 
individual performance on achievement tests. In the economic literature there is a body of 
work studying the determinants of cognitive achievement. This work focuses both on parental 
inputs and youth environment and on the relationship between schooling inputs and cognitive 
test scores (e.g., Todd & Wolpin, 2003 for an elaborate and excellent review). In general, a 
positive correlation between inputs and cognitive test scores is obtained. The present research 
adds the importance of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in determining test scores, which 
influences how well students perform on these cognitive tests. IQ and achievement during 
childhood (typically measured by psychologists), is very predictive for a wide variety of later 
outcomes. An important question is whether this predictive power is due to intelligence or can 
be explained by other factors that determine test scores. Recent papers have pointed at the 
interrelationship between cognitive and noncognitive skills (e.g., Heckman, Stixrud & Urzua, 
2006, Cunha, Heckman & Schennach, 2010, Heckman, Humphries & Mader, 2011, Moffitt et 
al., 2011 and Prevoo & Ter Weel, 2012). They demonstrate that self-discipline or self-control, 
conscientiousness and determination are equally important in explaining a variety of 
economic outcomes in the sense that movements from the bottom to the top of such 
noncognitive distributions have comparable effects on many outcome measures relative to 
cognitive skills. If IQ and achievement tests are affected by noncognitive factors, it could 
explain the high predictive power of these tests. This calls for an economic framework to 
disentangle the various influences (e.g., Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman & Humphries, 2011). 
This paper offers such a framework. The relationship between motivation and test scores is 
also subject to investigation for a long time (e.g., Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman & Ter 
Weel, 2008, for a discussion and overview).  
 Psychologists have been worried about motivation interfering with intelligence and 
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economists have shown that test scores can be improved by incentive payments. For example, 
Gneezy & Rustichini (2000), Angrist & Lavy (2009) and Kremer, Miguel & Thornton (2009) 
show that high enough payments provide incentives to people to work harder. By contrast, 
Fryer (2011) only finds moderate effects for rewarding students to read books or for other 
desirable behaviours on performance across several experiments in large US cities. However, 
his experiments do not involve direct incentive payment during achievement tests. In another 
experiment he shows that aligning incentives between students, parents and schools by 
financial rewards improves students’ test scores (Fryer, 2012). Bettinger (2010) also reports 
that providing financial incentives (in elementary school) for getting better test scores or 
grades yields little to no effects on student achievement. Angrist, Lang & Oreopoulos (2009) 
report on an experimental evaluation of strategies to improve student performance in a 
Canadian university. They find that particularly women improve study habits and obtain 
higher grades when they are offered academic support services and financial incentives. 
Winters, Trivitt & Greene (2010) and Liu & Neilson (2011) investigate whether schools with 
an incentive to focus on those subjects that play a role in the accountability system decrease 
attention to subjects that are not part of such a programme.  Our paper adds to these papers by 
estimating the technology of answering questions during an IQ test, which helps us to 
understand the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. 
 Finally, our work is most closely related to the contribution of Segal (2012). She 
investigates whether the most motivated subjects are the most cognitive able ones.  She finds 
that test scores relate to economic success not only because of cognitive ability but also 
because of favourable personality traits, which is consistent with our findings in Borghans, 
Meijers & Ter Weel (2008). The present paper is unique in the sense that we are able to 
distinguish the degrees of difficulty of the questions.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 builds the theoretical background and 
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presents the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the data and documents a number of 
descriptive results. Section 4 shows the estimation results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Theory and strategy 
 This section presents an economic approach to answering questions on a cognitive 
test. Conducting a cognitive test implies making decisions. This decision-making process is 
considered to be an economic activity in the same way as other behavioural outcomes such as 
school and job performance.  
 The main input in the performance of a cognitive test is time. By thinking longer the 
probability of finding the right answer can be increased. The technology of answering a 
question is expected to be an upward sloping and concave function of time. Figure 1 shows 
this relationship. On the horizontal axis we plot time and on the vertical axis the probability of 
giving the correct answer. The concave relationship is the probability of submitting the 
correct answer, which is increasing in time. The participant’s decision is when to stop 
thinking and to submit the answer. The decision to stop and submit depends on the technology 
(the expected increase in performance when thinking longer), the preference for submitting 
the right answer and the disutility of time. These preferences are shown by the line ߚ. 
 The utility function of a person conducting on an achievement test can be written as 
 ܷ ൌ ߚ൫݅௤, ݁൯݌௤ሺݐሻ െ ݐ        (1) 
in which ߚ represents the value of a good answer relative to the value of time (ݐ). In equation 
(1) ݌௤ሺݐሻ is the probability of a right answer on question ݍ conditional on time, and ݅௤ and ݁ 
are variables to capture intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, respectively. The intrinsic 
motivation can vary between questions. The first-order condition with respect to time 
determines optimal time investment: ௗ௎ௗ௧ െ ߚ൫݅௤, ݁൯
ௗ௣೜ሺ௧ሻ
ௗ௧ െ 1 ൌ 0.  
 We analyse performance as the optimization of preferences conditional on technology. 
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This implies that we separate ability, as revealed by the technology used to answer a question, 
from preferences. Together ability and preferences determine choices and outcomes on the 
test. Technology is identified by exogenously varying the time people use to answer a 
question. Our data (which will be described in Section 3) contain both variation in the time 
constraint a participant faces and in monetary incentives. Together, time constraints and 
incentives determine the time people invest to answer a question. Different combinations of 
time constraints and incentives enable us to measure the technology function. If participants 
are able to improve test scores not only by investing more time but also by exerting more 
effort, variation in incentives will not only affect the time invested but also the effort exerted. 
Our strategy is to use the variation in monetary incentives to investigate whether or not the 
time invested to answer a question sufficiently describes what people do to improve their 
scores. 
 Once the production function representing the technology is known, we can 
investigate ߚ, which is determined by the technology assuming, that people decide optimally 
about the time they invest in a question: 
ߚ൫݅௤, ݁൯ ൌ ଵ൬೏೛೜ሺ೟ሻ೏೟ ൰
        (2) 
By estimating the technology and measuring the time people invest to answer a question, we 
are able to disentangle how intrinsic and extrinsic motivation affect the value of answering a 
question rightly. Our strategy is to estimate ߚ under different circumstances to investigate 
how the value of answering a question rightly varies. 
 A number of possibilities is investigated. First, if only the expected monetary benefits 
would matter for participants, ߚ would be proportional to the monetary incentives provided. 
Since we observe that participants also invest time in answering questions when there are no 
rewards, there appears to be an intrinsic value of answering questions. It seems natural to add 
intrinsic motivation to the model additively. This would lead to a linear relationship between 
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ߚ and the monetary incentives provided: ߚ൫݅௤, ݁൯ ൌ ݅௤ ൅ ߙ݁, where ݅௤ and ݁ are again 
variables to capture intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (incentives).  
 Our second approach is to investigate possible complementarities between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. We model this as a CES-function: ߚ൫݅௤, ݁൯ ൌ ൫݅௤ఘ ൅ ߙ݁ఘ൯ଵ/ఘ. The 
target is to estimate the value of the elasticity of substitution  ଵଵିఘ, which should be equal to 1 
in case of complementarity.  
 If a full non-parametric estimation of the technology function would be available, we 
would be able to estimate ߚ by one over the derivatives of the technology function evaluated 
at the time people invested, given the circumstances. Since our data only allows us to 
determine the technology function at a few points on the time-axis, this approach leads to an 
upper and a lower bound for ߚ. Figure 2 shows how we can determine ߚ using the properties 
of the technology function, which is in this example based on two observations combining the 
amount of time used answering questions (ݐଵ and ݐଶ) and the probability of a correct answer 
(݌ሺݐଵሻ and ݌ሺݐଶሻ). Due to the concavity of the production function, ߚ has to be larger than 
௧భ
௣ሺ௧భሻ and smaller than
௧మି௧భ
௣ሺ௧మሻି௣ሺ௧భሻ. Finally, to further investigate how people answer questions a 
parametric specification of the technology function is needed. The functional form we apply 
in this paper is: ݌ሺݐሻ ൌ 1 െ ߜݐఈ, which can be linearly estimated by ln൫1 െ ݌ሺݐሻ൯ ൌ lnሺߜሻ ൅
ߙlnሺݐሻ. Assuming optimal behaviour, it can be derived that ߚ ൌ െݐଵିఈ/ߙߜ.  
 In the empirical application of this model we will pool questions together and estimate 
this equation for groups of questions separately. 
 
3. Data  
To estimate the model we use data from an experiment we reported about elsewhere 
(Borghans, Meijers and Ter Weel, 2008). In this experiment students have to answer 
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questions from several different IQ tests with different time constraints and financial 
incentives. 128 students participated in the experiment. They were all Dutch students from 
Maastricht University and the experiment was conducted in Dutch. The experiment was 
conducted in thirteen sessions in one week during the spring of 2006. We do not obtain 
differences in test scores between groups of students, which makes us confident that 
contamination and sharing answers with others is not biasing our results. We present the most 
salient details here and have put other details and information about the different types of 
questions in an appendix at the end of the paper. Our previous paper reports in greater detail 
about the setup of the total experiment. 
 The data we use here are from the part of the experiment in which seven sets of ten 
questions had to be answered. In each set there was a possible time constraint (no time 
constraint, 60 seconds or 30 seconds) and incentive payment (no payment, €0.10, €0.40 or 
€1.00 for each correct answer). Subjects always had to complete one set of questions without 
incentive payment and two sets of questions under each incentive payment regime. The 
maximum earnings are €30.00. The average earnings were €16.53 (standard deviation €3.44). 
All respondents had to answer the full set of questions, but we randomized the order to 
separate the effect of tiredness and experience with the questions from the difficulty of the 
question.  
 There is a distinction between two types of cognitive processes: those executed 
quickly with little conscious deliberation and those that are slower and more reflective (e.g. 
Epstein, 1994). The questions we have applied in our experiment refer to the former, with the 
exception of the cognitive reflection test (CRT). Similar to the questions that can be executed 
relatively quickly, the CRT questions have a more or less spontaneously answer, but this is 
often the wrong answer. Frederick (2005) provides a number of examples of such questions. 
Appendix A.2 presents an example of such a question and examples of each of the other six 
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different types of questions. The questions we use in the experiment are often used in IQ tests 
and differ in the degree of difficulty.  
 After each block of ten questions, there was a one minute break during which subjects 
could recover but were not allowed to do anything else then sit still. After these seven sets of 
questions this part of the experiment ended. 
 
4. Results 
 This section documents a set of estimation results in which we estimate the technology 
to obtain a better understanding of how participants behave during our experiment. 
 
4.1. Basic results 
 The experimental variation in the time limits to answer questions on the test combined 
with the different payments assigned to a block of questions induce exogenous variation in the 
time subjects think about answering a question. In this section we explore this variation. 
 Figure 3 presents the experimental equivalent of Figure 1. The dots in the figure 
represent the average time that is invested to answer a question and the average scores for 
each of these circumstances. The coding of the dots in the figure is the following. The first 
digit represents the time limit imposed: 1 is a 30 second time limit, 2 is a 60 second time limit 
and 3 is no time limit imposed. The second digit represents the incentive pay: 0 is no pay, 1 is 
€0.10, 2 is €0.40 and 3 is €1.00 for submitting the correct answer on a question. The curve has 
been fitted by ln൫1 െ ݌ሺݐሻ൯ ൌ ܥ ൅ ߙଵln ሺݐሻ), in which ݌ሺݐሻ and lnሺݐሻ are population and 
question averages for the different circumstances. Since questions have been pooled, we omit 
the index ݍ from now on. Overall, Figure 3 shows a concave pattern of the relationship 
between the probability of submitting a correct answer and time investment, which is 
consistent with the theory plotted in Figure 1. 
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 An empirical question is whether time sufficiently describes the effort people put in to 
answer a question. To investigate this we make use of the points in Figure 3 to estimate the 
technology controlling for time investments and incentive payments. The idea is that if 
participants are not only able to vary the time they invest in answering a question but also 
improve their scores by thinking harder, we expect that questions with a high reward will be 
answered better, even when conditioning for time investments. Table 1 displays the results of 
estimating several versions of the relationship between ln൫1 െ ݌ሺݐሻ൯ and time investments 
and incentives payments. In the first column we only include time investments to explain 
ln൫1 െ ݌ሺݐሻ൯. This exercise returns a significant coefficient, suggesting that the longer people 
think about answering a question the higher is the probability of submitting the correct 
answer. When we add a dummy for incentive payments, it turns out that incentive payments 
do not explain ݌ሺݐሻ. In the third column we show the results of adding the different incentive 
schemes. This leads to similar conclusions. In the results presented in the fourth column we 
leave out time investments and only include incentive payments to explain ln൫1 െ ݌ሺݐሻ൯. The 
estimates in the fourth column of Table 1 show that the value of the question indeed leads to 
better scores, especially in the case of no time restrictions. However, when we add time 
investments (see column (5)) this effect becomes small and insignificant. The estimation 
results presented in Table 1 suggest that time investments are the main channel through which 
subjects are able to invest in higher test scores. Thinking harder as a result of incentive 
payments does not improve scores. The line in Figure 3 provides the prediction of this 
specification.  
 
4.2. Exploring heterogeneity between questions 
 Not all questions are equally difficult to answer. Some questions turn out to be easier 
and others are extremely hard for our population. We take advantage of this heterogeneity to 
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explore the data further. To take into account the heterogeneity across different questions, we 
split the sample into four quartiles of varying difficulty. To determine the difficulty of a 
question we use the average scores in the case when a time limit of 30 seconds was applied. 
Under these circumstances there is not much scope to vary time investment, which provides 
us with approximately the scores conditional on the time investment.  
 Figure 4 shows the relationship between time investments and the probability of 
submitting a correct answer for the four quartiles. The darkest dots present the easiest 
questions, the lightest dots the hardest ones. Again, we make use of the exogenous variation 
provided by the experiment. We observe that the four levels of difficulty yield differences in 
the technology of answering these questions. For harder questions much more time is invested 
relative to easier questions.  
 Table 2 provides a set of regression results for this technology function. We estimate 
models in which we interact time investments with dummies for the different quartiles. The 
easiest questions serve as the reference group. The results displayed in the first column of 
Table 2 confirm the estimates in Table 1 by pointing towards a strong role for time 
investments in explaining the probability of a correct answer. Also, as columns (2) and (3) 
suggest, incentive payments only change this picture when we neglect time investments 
(column (2)). More precisely, as column (3) reveals, incentive payments do not seem to lead 
to higher scores when we control for time investments. This is consistent with the set of 
estimates presented in Table 1. 
  
4.3. Explaining intrinsic and extrinsic behaviour 
 Figure 2 has shown how we can use the different time limits to determine the 
functional form of the relationship between the probability of submitting a correct answer and 
time investments. Using these data points from our sample from the experiment, we can now 
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determine the upper and lower bounds of the value of time investments when answering a 
question. We again split the data according to the four levels of difficulty and in questions 
with and without incentive payments. 
 Table 3 provides an overview of the results. We only use the answers to questions for 
which there was no time limit because time limits may interfere with optimal levels of time 
investments. This has the additional advantage that the results are independent from the 
determination of the quartiles in level of difficulty, which is based on questions with a 30 
second time limit. In the first two columns we document the time investment and average 
scores without incentive payments and in the next two columns the same with incentive 
payments. The rows show the level of difficulty with ݀ଵ being the easiest quartile and ݀ସ the 
hardest questions. As before, we obtain that time investments are higher when incentives are 
provided. Also, the scores are higher. From this information lower and upper bounds of the 
value of answering a question correctly can be derived, following the procedure sketched in 
Section 2. The final two columns in Table 3 show the results. The standard errors of this 
approach are large. However, even at this level of uncertainty, the value of answering the 
hardest questions correctly is significantly higher than the value of answering the easiest 
question in a correct way. This suggests that people are not only triggered by incentive 
payments, but seem to like to invest more time in the harder questions relative to the easier 
questions.  
 When we apply the parametric model to the data, more precise estimates are obtained. 
Table 4 provides estimates for ߚ using the same specifications as shown in Table 1, in which 
all questions are pooled. The assumption is that time investments are done optimally. For 
questions with time limits, optimal time investment might not be feasible because it could be 
the case to subjects would have liked to invest more time than 30 or 60 seconds. The 
coefficients in Table 4 indeed show that the implied value of answering a question is rather 
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constant across the different incentive schemes for the questions with a time limit of 30 or 60 
seconds. In case the subjects have unlimited time to answer a question (shown in the final row 
of Table 4), the increase in the value of submitting the correct answer is much larger. The 
increase in value is relatively large moving from no incentive payment to a payment of €0.10. 
This suggests that the distinction between no incentive payments and any incentive is 
relatively large compared to the effect of the monetary reward as such. 
 Again we can do the same for the four quartiles. Table 5 provides the results for the 
questions without time limits. Comparing this parametric approach with the nonparametric 
upper and lower bounds in Table 3 shows that the parametric estimates for the easy questions 
are above the upper bound but still within the 95 per cent confidence interval of the 
nonparametric estimates. This suggests that the parametric specification we applied is flatter 
for low values of t than the data suggests. A slightly more curved function might fit the data 
better. The results in the table reveal several things. Without incentive payments subjects 
attach a higher value to harder questions relative to easier questions as is shown by the first 
column. Moving to columns two to four incentive payments increase the value of time for 
answering questions. The difference between easier and harder questions becomes larger 
when incentive payments are introduced. Together these results suggest that the effect of 
intrinsic motivation (revealed by the value attached to harder questions) and extrinsic 
motivation (the incentive payments) is not an additive process.  
 To show this, we fit a CES production function to the coefficients displayed in Table 
5. We include dummy variables for each level of difficulty (݀௜) and for each incentive 
payment scheme (݀௘). We estimate ߚሺ݅, ݁ሻ ൌ ሺ݀௜ ൅ ݀௘ሻଵ/ሺଵାఘሻ. A value of ߩ ൌ 0 indicates 
linearity which would imply that the value of submitting a correct answer is an additive 
function of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Note that since each value of ݅ and ݁ is 
represented by a dummy variable, the power of ߩ on the terms within brackets has no 
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meaning and is not displayed here.  
 Table 6 provides the results of estimating the CES production function. We apply two 
different specifications: a sample using the four quartiles and a sample using eight levels of 
difficulty. In both specifications we obtain an estimated ߩ close to –1. This suggests that an 
additive specification of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation does not fit the data and the actual 
model is close to multiplicative. The conclusion we draw from this finding is that both 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in answering questions during IQ tests are relevant and that 
both types of motivation are not independent from each other. This suggests that extrinsic 
motivation, such as in high-stakes tests, is likely to only partially explain student performance 
and that intrinsic motivation is relevant too.  
 Together, our findings suggest that performance on an IQ test is not just a matter of 
intelligence, but is also in an interactive way influenced by intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
Participants perform best when they are challenged by the type of questions and are rewarded 
for good performance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This research presents an economic framework of how participants behave during an 
IQ test. We have built a theory in which we distinguish a technology that shows how 
performance can be improved by investing more time into answering questions from 
individual preferences to exert effort when confronted with different types of questions. Our 
main findings are that the individual scores on IQ tests are not only the result of intelligence, 
but also of time investments and preferences. In particular our experimental data allow us to 
distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. By providing incentive payments, 
people invest more time in answering a question and this complements their intrinsic motives 
to show their willingness to do well on the test. The alternative theory that extrinsic and 
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intrinsic motivation are additive is not confirmed in our data. 
 This paper is a first step to better understand how IQ scores are determined by 
different circumstances and how they differ not only based on intelligence but also on 
differences in preferences across individuals. This notion is potentially important for applied 
research in both economics and psychology. Economists are increasingly interested in 
psychological variables concerning intelligence, achievement and personality to understand 
investments in human capital, allocation in the labour market and economic outcomes of 
behaviour. Psychologists have well-developed instruments, such as IQ tests and personality 
tests, that are targeted at psychological questions. Applying these instruments for questions 
that typically interest economists can easily lead to biases, as shown by the literature on the 
effects of incentives on IQ scores (e.g., Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). For these purposes these 
psychological measures have to be interpreted in an economic perspective. 
 This paper is a first step to understand how an IQ test has to be understood from an 
economic point of view by explicitly taking into account how the ability of a participant and 
his preferences (for a high score and time investments) determine the scores. Such a 
framework allows us to disentangle the effects of ability and various aspects of preferences, 
which is necessary for our understanding of why some people do well on IQ tests and why IQ 
tests predict later outcomes. 
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Appendix 
 This appendix provides details about the setup of the experiment and provides 
examples of each of the seven types of IQ questions asked to subjects. The instructions and 
the computer programs used to conduct the experiment are available upon request. 
 
A.1. Experimental setup 
 128 subjects participated in the experiment. They were all students from Maastricht 
University recruited by email through the communication office of the university. The email 
contained a hyperlink referring to a webpage through which people could register. Upon 
registration we asked questions about gender, date and place of birth, highest level of 
education of both parents, and college major.  
 The experiment was run in the week of 15-19 May 2006 in the experimental 
laboratory of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at Maastricht University. 
There were thirteen sessions: Three on Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday and one on 
Tuesday morning. The sessions lasted for almost 2.5 hours. The morning session started at 
8.30 hrs, the early afternoon session at 12.00 hrs. and the late afternoon session at 15.30 hrs.  
During initial registration we randomly selected subjects into groups of 10-15 subjects and 
assigned them to sessions. All subjects received an invitation by email. Upon arrival subjects 
had to wait in front of the laboratory until everybody arrived. There are no differences 
between outcomes for different groups.  
 The laboratory consists of two rooms separated by a slide door. In both rooms there 
are twelve computers available separated by screens, so people cannot see each other. Every 
subject was assigned to a computer number and login name and password upon arrival. We 
experimented with rooms consisting of females and males only and with rooms where males 
sat next to females only and females next to males. There are no significant differences 
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between females sitting next to males and females sitting in a room with females only. The 
same goes for males. One room was equipped with an air-conditioning system, but this too 
does not show up in the results. There are also no significant differences between sessions at 
different times of the day, supervisor etc.  
 The supervision during the experiment was always conducted by two persons: One 
professional and one of the authors. The professional made sure people were not talking and 
looking at other people’s answers (which made no sense because all questions were assigned 
randomly, so nobody had the same question at the same time). He also guided people to the 
exit when they completed the experiment. We controlled the progress of the experiment on a 
master computer. On this computer the progress and cumulative earnings of every participant 
were followed. After a subject completed the experiment, he had to leave the room to receive 
his total earnings in cash in a separate room. 
 Before the sessions started, one of the authors read the instructions to all participants. 
All subjects were entitled to receiving a show up fee of €5.00, which was paid after having 
finished the entire test. During the cognitive tests they could earn €30.00 when they answered 
all questions correctly. The average earnings during the cognitive test were €16.53.  
 The experiment was programmed in PHP/MySQL and subjects completed the 
experiment using the Microsoft Internet Explorer. All computers showed the login screen 
upon arrival and when subjects logged on to the experiment they could start. It was not 
possible to go back and forth in the program so once an answer had been given and the 
subject had pressed “continue” or once time ran out during questions with a time constraint, 
the next question appeared on the screen. 
 The data were collected on a server. The investment in answering the cognitive test 
questions is measured in milliseconds. Because server time can be longer when the network is 
in heavy use, we checked delays. The average delay is about 2 seconds, with no differences 
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between the different sessions. 
 
A.2. Types of questions 
 We now document representative examples of the seven types of different IQ 
questions subjects had to answer during the experiment. For each type of IQ questions an 
example is given here by a screen-dump of that specific question, followed by a translation. 
The button “ga verder”, which is present in all examples, means “continue”. In case of time 
limits the bar at the right start at the marks 30 or 60 and becomes smaller and smaller until it 
reaches 0. If the time limit is reached the experiment continues with the next question. 
Awards for questions and time limits are randomly chosen in the experiment and here added 
to some question by means of example 
 
Raven matrix 
 
 
 
The time limit for this question is 30 sec. The 
value for a correct answer is €0.10 
 
Which of the six figures should be placed in 
the empty square? 
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Cognitive Reflection Test 
 The time limit for this question is 60 sec. The 
value for a correct answer is €1 
 
If 5 machines need 5 minutes to produce 5 
widgets, how long need 100 machines to 
produce 100 widgets? 
 
…minutes 
 
Fill out the number and click on ‘continue’ 
 
 
 
Anagram 
 
 
 
Choose the word containing the characters of 
which no car brand can be made 
 
 
 
Select the correct answer and click 
subsequently on ‘continue’ 
 
 
 
 
Sequences or matrices of numbers 
  
The value for a correct answer is €0.40 
 
 
 
Fill out the missing number 
 
 
 
Fill out the number and click on ‘continue’ 
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Sequence or matrix of characters 
 
 
The value for a correct answer is €0.10 
 
 
Fill out the missing character 
 
 
 
 
Fill out the character and click on ‘continue’ 
 
 
 
Filling in linking words 
 
 
 
The time limit for this question is 30 sec. 
 
Fill out the word that forms the last characters 
of the first word and the first characters of the 
last word 
 
 
 
Fill out the word and click on ‘continue’ 
 
 
 
Stranger in our midst 
 
 
 
The time limit for this question is 60 sec. The 
value of a correct answer is €1 
 
What is the stranger in our midst? 
 
 
 
 
 
Tick the correct answer and click 
subsequently on ‘continue’ 
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A.3. Instructions 
 Before the experiment started students were assigned a chair and a computer. They 
were read a set of rules of conduct and given a username and log in code. Once they were 
logged in, they had to read instructions from the screen before they could start with the 
experiment. All instructions were in Dutch and below we provide a translation. The 
translation is in italics. 
 
Screen 1 
This research consists of a number of parts. First, a set of questions on personality traits will 
be asked. There are four blocks with statements. You have to state to what extent they are 
applicable to you. Everybody is different, so there are no good or bad answers. Fill in the 
answer that you think suits you best.  
After this block you will have to answer a set of 10 questions from an IQ test. Only one 
possible answer is the right one. Questions differ in terms of difficulty and type. Some 
questions are easy, while others are almost impossible to answer correctly.  
The first two parts of the experiment take about 30 minutes. 
After this, we present 7 sets of 10 questions where you can earn money. Everybody receives a 
payment of €5 for showing up, but most participants are likely to add €15-€25 to this amount. 
This can be more if you perform very well.  
This part of the experiment will take about 90 minutes. 
After you have completed the questions you are allowed to leave. On the screen you will see 
in what room you can collect your money. If you leave earlier or do not complete the 
experiment, we cannot pay you any money. 
 
Screen 2 
Instructions for personality traits measurement. These are irrelevant for the present paper. 
After the personality questions are done the following instruction screen pops up. 
 
Screen 3 
You are now about to start the IQ test. The first set of 10 questions will be presented to you 
now. Questions differ in terms of difficulty and type. Some questions are easy, while others 
are almost impossible to answer correctly. 
After this set of 10 questions the following instruction appeared on the screen. 
 
 22
Screen 4 
We continue with 7 blocks of 10 questions for which you can earn money. You will receive 
similar types of questions as in the first block.  
Two things are going to change. 
First, during some blocks you will receive money for submitting the correct answer. 
Second, sometimes we include a time limit. If time has run out the following question appears. 
At the beginning of each block of 10 questions the one of the following screens appeared. 
 
Screen 5a 
For the next block of ten questions you will receive € … for submitting the correct answer. 
You are allowed to spend … seconds on the question. When time runs out the next question 
appears on the screen. 
 
Screen 5b 
For the next block of ten questions you will receive € … for submitting the correct answer. 
There is no time limit for this block. 
 
Screen 5c 
For the next block of ten questions you will receive no pay for submitting the correct answer. 
You are allowed to spend … seconds on the question. When time runs out the next question 
appears on the screen. 
 
Screen 5d 
For the next block of ten questions you will receive no pay for submitting the correct answer. 
There is no time limit for this block. 
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Figure 1 
The theoretical relationship between the probability of  
submitting the correct answer and time 
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Figure 2 
Constraints on the slope of the tangent 
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Figure 3 
The pattern obtained from the experiment between the probability of  
submitting the correct answer and time investment 
 
 
 
Note: The coding of the dots is the following. The first digit represents the time limit imposed: 1 is a 30 second 
time limit, 2 is a 60 second time limit and 3 is no time limit imposed. The second digit represents the incentive 
pay: 0 is no pay, 1 is €0.10, 2 is €0.40 and 3 is €1.00 for submitting the correct answer on a question.  
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Figure 4 
The pattern obtained from the experiment between the probability of  
submitting the correct answer and time investment for different quartiles of the distribution 
 
 
 
Note: Questions are selected into four different quartiles based on the average scores. The darkest dots are the 
questions that were the easiest, the lightest dots are the questions that turned out to be the hardest ones. The 
coding of the dots is the following. The first digit represents the time limit imposed: 1 is a 30 second time limit, 
2 is a 60 second time limit and 3 is no time limit imposed. The second digit represents the incentive pay: 0 is no 
pay, 1 is €0.10, 2 is €0.40 and 3 is €1.00 for submitting the correct answer on a question.  
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Table 1 
Estimation results of the technology function  
(dependent variable: one minus the probability of submitting a correct answer) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
time investments lnሺݐሻ -0.43 (0.03) -0.43 (0.03) -0.43 (0.04) -0.48 (0.06) 
incentive payments dummy 0.00 (0.03) 0.04 (0.09) -0.02 (0.03) 
 €0.10  -0.02 (0.04)  
 €0.40  0.01 (0.04)  
 €1.00  -0.01 (0.04)  
Combined dummy*no limit  -0.32 (0.09) 0.06 (0.06) 
R2  0.95 0.96 0.96 0.59 0.95 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 2 
Regression results for the technology function in which time investments interact with dummies for four different quartiles 
(dependent variable: one minus probability of submitting the correct answer) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
time investments lnሺݐሻ -1.87 (0.21) -1.76 (0.25) 
 lnሺݐሻ כ ݀ଶ 1.02 (0.24) 0.98 (0.25) 
 lnሺݐሻ כ ݀ଷ 1.25 (0.23) 1.19 (0.24) 
 lnሺݐሻ כ ݀ସ 1.73 (0.22) 1.65 (0.24) 
incentive payments dummy  0.00 (0.07) -0.03 (0.04) 
combined dummy*no limit  -0.43 (0.07) -0.06 (0.07) 
dummies ݀ଶ -1.44 (0.79) 1.30 (0.08) -1.35 (0.80) 
 ݀ଷ -1.85 (0.74) 1.63 (0.08) -1.70 (0.76) 
 ݀ସ -3.09 (0.71) 2.12 (0.08) -2.89 (0.74) 
R2  0.98 0.95 0.98 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. d2, d3, and d4 are dummies for second, third and fourth quartiles in difficulty, respectively. The first quartile, the easiest 
questions, serves as a reference group. 
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Table 3 
Upper and lower bounds based on four levels of difficulty with and without incentive payments 
 
 Without incentive payments With incentive payments Bounds 
 t p t p Lower bound Upper bound 
݀ଵ 21.12 0.87 22.54 0.90 24.25 (1.32) 52.20 (60.72) 
݀ଶ 32.96 0.58 37.89 0.62 56.40 (3.57) 122.08 (98.39) 
݀ଷ 38.45 0.47 47.63 0.48 82.47 (5.63) 783.35 (1964.49) 
݀ସ 51.78 0.15 59.38 0.16 349.52 (52.20) 703.39 (1478.07) 
 
Note: t is measured in seconds. 
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Table 4 
The value of answering a question in different incentive schemes obtained from assuming optimal investment behaviour  
 
  Incentive payments 
  No incentive payment €0.10 €0.40 €1.00 
Time limit 30 seconds 97.87 (7.69) 97.89 (7.45) 100.53 (7.58) 101.68 (7.63) 
 60 seconds 170.80 (12.93) 192.98 (12.57) 180.86 (12.05) 200.31 (12.88) 
 No limit 247.76 (20.06) 344.90 (24.54) 444.68 (30.51) 484.07 (34.35) 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
The value of answering a question in different incentive schemes as obtained from assuming optimal investment behaviour without time limits  
 
 Incentive payments 
 No incentive payment €0.10 €0.40 €1.00 
݀ଵ 144.53 (35.31) 165.34 (34.77) 254.73 (56.13) 221.43 (41.86) 
݀ଶ 124.42 (22.23) 233.95 (32.81) 222.18 (33.52) 268.83 (38.23) 
݀ଷ 158.50 (23.52) 233.62 (29.70) 348.46 (44.78) 407.26 (45.77) 
݀ସ 619.86 (66.44) 789.54 (78.34) 1004.86 (90.09) 1101.23 (114.08) 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6 
Estimation results of the CES function with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, based on four and eight levels of difficulty 
 
  (1) (2) 
 ߩ -0.93 (0.23) -0.88 (0.19) 
difficulty of questions  ݀ଶ 1.01 (0.03) 1.01 (0.03) 
 ݀ଶ 1.04 (0.16) 0.93 (0.17) 
 ݀ସ 1.18 (0.78) 0.99 (0.05) 
 ݀ହ 0.96 (0.09) 
 ݀଺ 1.06 (0.17) 
 ݀଻ 1.29 (0.76) 
 ଼݀ 1.36 (0.97) 
incentive payments no incentive payments 0.44 (1.58) 0.86 (1.76) 
 €0.10 0.48 (1.75) 0.95 (1.99) 
 €0.40 0.51 (1.88) 1.01 (2.14) 
 €1.00 0.51 (1.91) 1.04 (2.21) 
 
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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